Voter ID in Wisconsin: A Better Approach to Anderson/Burdick Balancing by Pikor, Matthew R.
Seventh Circuit Review 
Volume 10 Issue 2 Article 8 
5-1-2015 
Voter ID in Wisconsin: A Better Approach to Anderson/Burdick 
Balancing 
Matthew R. Pikor 
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Matthew R. Pikor, Voter ID in Wisconsin: A Better Approach to Anderson/Burdick Balancing, 10 Seventh 
Circuit Rev. 465 (2015). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss2/8 
This Voter Id Law is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ 
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 10, Issue 2                        Spring 2015 
 
465 
VOTER ID IN WISCONSIN: A BETTER APPROACH 
TO ANDERSON BURDICK BALANCING 
 
 
MATTHEW R. PIKOR* 
 
Cite as: Matthew R. Pikor, Voter ID in Wisconsin: A Better Approach to 






 Ruthelle Frank was born in her home in Brokaw, Wisconsin, in 
1927.1 Her mother made a record of her birth in the family Bible, but 
the state did not issue her a birth certificate.2 A lifelong resident of 
Wisconsin, she currently serves her community as an elected member 
of the Brokaw Village Board.3 She has exercised her right to vote in 
every election since 1948.4  
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1 Jon Sherman, Out in the Cold at Age 84: Wisconsin’s Ruthelle Frank Fights 




3 ACLU Files Lawsuit Challenging Wisconsin’s Unconstitutional Voter ID 
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Unfortunately, Ruthelle will be unable to cast a ballot in the 
next election because of Wisconsin’s new voter identification (“ID”) 
law. The law requires that Wisconsin residents present one of several 
qualifying forms of photo ID before voting.5 Ruthelle has a 
certification of baptism, a Medicare statement, and a checkbook; but 
she has been unable to obtain one of the acceptable forms of ID.6 In 
order to acquire a qualifying form of ID under the Wisconsin law, 
Ruthelle needs a birth certificate.7 However, the state refuses to issue 
her one because her name on file with the state Register of Deeds 
contains a spelling error; and she cannot petition the court to amend 
the document without paying as much as $200 in fees.8 If she 
successfully fixes the error, she must then pay $20 for a copy of the 
birth certificate.9 Next, she would need to take it, along with 2 other 
forms of proof, to a local government office to obtain the ID required 
by the state.10 For Ruthelle, a woman in her late 80s on a fixed 
income, these hurdles are not trivial. 
 Although Ruthelle Frank’s situation may appear unique, an 
estimated 300,000 of Wisconsin’s residents must now take some 
affirmative action to satisfy these new requirements to vote.11 In 
December of 2011, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed 
suit on behalf of Ms. Frank and all other similarly situated voters, 
seeking to prevent implementation of Wisconsin’s voter ID law, also 
known as Act 23.12 The ACLU claimed Act 23 imposed an undue 
                                                 
5 See id. 
6 Tanya Somanader, Wisconsin Voter ID Law May Force 84-Year-Old Woman 






10 Sherman, supra note 1. 
11 Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev'd, 768 F.3d 
744 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015). 
12 ACLU Files Lawsuit Challenging Wisconsin’s Unconstitutional 
Voter ID Law, supra note 3. 
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burden on voters in violation of constitutional protections under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.13 
 Supporters of Wisconsin’s “strict”14 voter ID law claimed that 
it was necessary to detect and prevent voter fraud, maintain confidence 
in election integrity, and improve election administration.15 But critics 
of the law argued that voter fraud is virtually non-existent in 
Wisconsin and voter confidence is unrelated to the strictness of a 
state’s voting laws.16 They also argued that the law suppresses voter 
turnout in large numbers. Because for many, the perceived difference 
of one vote is outweighed by the time, effort, and cost required to 
satisfy the new requirement. They also contend the law makes voting 
impossible for many and that low-income and minority subgroups are 
disproportionately affected by the regulations.17 These subgroups of 
voters are generally more likely to vote democratic. Thus support and 
opposition for Act 23 among legislators was sharply divided along 
partisan lines.18  
 Mrs. Frank’s claim in Frank v. Walker came fresh on the heels 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Board, where the high court considered strict voter ID 
requirements for the first time.19 In Crawford, the Court considered a 
                                                 
13 Id. 
14 “Strict” voter ID laws require further action from voters without acceptable 
ID before their ballots will count. For example, Act 23 provides that voters without 
ID may vote on a provisional ballot but must provide a qualified photo ID to the 
election inspectors before polls close or to the municipal clerk by 4:00pm on the 
following Friday. Wendy Underhill, Voter Identification Requirements, Voter Id 
Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx. 
15 Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 847. 
16 Id. at 847-48, 851.   
17 Id. at 862, 870. 
18 Wisconsin Assembly, Assembly Bill 7, 2011-2012 Wisconsin Legislature, 
Wisconsin State Legislature (May 11, 2011, 11:10pm), 
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/data/votes/av0331.pdf; Wisconsin Senate Roll Call, 
Assembly Bill 7, 2011-2012 Wisconsin Legislature, Wisconsin State Legislature 
(May 19, 2011, 11:03am), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/data/votes/sv0192.pdf.  
19 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
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facial challenge20 to Indiana’s SEA 483, a law similar to Wisconsin’s 
Act 23.21 There, the Court confirmed that the constitutionality of such 
voter ID laws is properly analyzed under the Anderson/Burdick 
balancing test, the prevailing method for evaluating election 
regulations.22 The Court concluded that state interests advanced by the 
requirement were sufficient to defeat the facial attack on the law.23 In 
his Crawford opinion, Justice Stevens noted that where an election 
regulation is facially neutral24 and supported by some valid 
justification, courts should not invalidate it merely because legislative 
proponents were partly seeking to entrench themselves in office.25 
This comment argues that the current constitutional evaluation 
of election regulations is inadequate. A more effective analysis should 
contemplate whether improper partisanship contributed to the passage 
of a law. Part I traces the development of the two-part test courts 
currently employ and its first application by the U.S. Supreme Court to 
voter ID laws in Crawford. Part II explores the recent challenge to 
Wisconsin’s voter ID law in both the Eastern District of Wisconsin 
and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Frank v. Walker. Finally, 
Part III analyzes the opinions in Frank and argues that a small change 
to the balancing test would yield more equitable results in cases where 
political motivations are highly suspect. 
 
                                                 
20 A “facial challenge” to a law is a challenge that claims the law, as written, is 
unconstitutional under all circumstances. In contrast, an “as-applied challenge” 
claims that a law is only unconstitutional in its particular application to the plaintiff. 
A successful facial challenge will result in complete invalidation of the law, where a 
successful as-applied challenge will result merely in modification of the law or the 
circumstances in which it may be applied. Richard H. Fallon Jr., Fact and Fiction 
about Facial Challenges, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 915, 922-25 (2011). available at: 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol99/iss4/1. 
21 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 188. 
22 Id. at 190-91. 
23 Id. at 202. 
24 A “facially neutral” law refers to a one that does not explicitly discriminate 
against a particular group. 
25 See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204. 
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I.  CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF ELECTION REGULATIONS 
 
The U.S. Constitution contains no explicit guarantee of voting 
rights. For much of the country’s early history, federal courts declined 
to extend any protections to citizens excluded from elections.26 
Instead, the federal judiciary insisted that any voting rights for citizens 
originated with the states.27 During this period, states restricted voting 
privileges based on gender, religion, race, national origin, property 
ownership, length of residency, economic status, and literacy.28 
Congress has since enacted four amendments to the 
Constitution to protect certain groups from discrimination at the polls. 
The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments 
collectively provided that voting rights could not be denied or 
abridged based on race, color, previous condition of servitude, sex, or 
age (for those having reached majority).29 The Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment prohibited the imposition of a poll tax,30 but only in 
federal elections.31 These amendments addressed certain forms of 
election-related discrimination; however, the Constitution still failed to 
affirm voting as a right. 
The Supreme Court began to recognize voting as a 
fundamental constitutional right during the civil rights era. With a 
liberal majority lead by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court deduced 
that the right to vote is fundamental because it is “preservative of other 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) (“Being 
unanimously of the opinion that the Constitution of the United States does not confer 
the right of suffrage upon any one, and that the constitutions and laws of the several 
States which commit that important trust to men alone are not necessarily void.”). 
27 See, e.g., id.  
28 See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED 
HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 53-70 (2000).  
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; U.S. CONST. amend. 
XXVI. 
30 A “poll tax” is any fee or tax required as a precondition to vote. 
31 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. 
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basic civil and political rights.”32 The Warren Court firmly established 
this premise over a string of cases challenging malapportioned districts 
in the early 1960s.33 And in 1966, the Court extended this reasoning to 
abolish the poll tax in all elections.34 In these cases, the Warren Court 
demonstrated that voting rights could be violated through dilution of 
the weight of a citizen’s vote and by unjustifiably burdening certain 
groups such as the poor.35 However, many commentators argued the 
Court failed to establish a clear and consistent method for evaluating 
ballot access restrictions in the voting rights cases that followed.36 
Nearly two decades later in 1983, the Court first began to outline the 
framework for the constitutional analysis used today in Anderson v. 
Celebrezze.37  
 
A.  The Anderson/Burdick test 
 
 In Anderson, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of Ohio’s 
early filing requirements for ballot access in presidential elections, 
which the state imposed only on independent candidates.38 There, the 
Court framed a balancing test.39 Justice Stevens acknowledged that 
states must substantially regulate their electoral processes.40 And in 
practice, any provision of a state’s complex regulatory scheme will 
affect voters’ potential political expression to some degree.41 But, 
                                                 
32 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).  
33 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
34 Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). 
35 Harper, 383 U.S. 663; Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533; Wesberry, 376 U.S. 1. 
36 E.g., Terry Smith, Election Laws and First Amendment Freedoms- 
Confusion And Clarification by the Supreme Court, 1988 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. 
597, 610, 621-22 (1988); Bradley A. Smith, Judicial Protection Of Ballot-Access 
Rights: Third Parties Need Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 186-87 (1991). 
37 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
38 Id. at 780. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 788. 
41 Id. 
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where a regulation’s restrictions are reasonable and nondiscriminatory, 
a state’s need to properly facilitate its election procedures will 
generally suffice as justification. Therefore, challengers of state 
election laws face a presumption in favor of the state.42 
In his opinion, Justice Stevens stated that to determine whether 
a particular restriction is justified, courts must weigh the character and 
magnitude of the asserted impairment to a plaintiff’s constitutional 
rights against the interests the state seeks to advance.43 At the same 
time, a court should consider the extent to which those burdens are 
necessary to achieve those state interests.44 Because of the numerosity 
and wide variation in type, effect, and importance of state election 
regulations, the Court declined to offer any bright line rules.45 Instead, 
it directed lower courts to weigh those factors and reach their own 
conclusions.46 
 The Court found that because the early filing requirement 
unequally burdened a certain group with specific and identifiable 
political preferences, it was “especially difficult for the state to 
justify.”47 It also determined that Ohio had less of a legitimate interest 
in a national election than it would in local contests.48 Therefore, the 
constitutional interests at stake outweighed any justification put forth 
by Ohio.49 
 Nearly ten years later, the Court created a bifurcated inquiry in 
Burdick v. Takushi.50 Justice White noted that under the standard 
outlined in Anderson, the proper level of scrutiny depends on the 
“extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth 
                                                 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 789. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 789-90. 
47 Id. at 792-93. 
48 Id. at 795. 
49 Id. at 806. 
50 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
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Amendment rights.”51 Accordingly, where those rights are severely 
restricted, strict scrutiny applies.52 Where restrictions impose less than 
severe restrictions, courts should apply the Anderson balance.53 This 
two-part test is now commonly referred to as the “Anderson/Burdick 
test.”  
In Burdick, the Court considered a challenge to Hawaii’s 
prohibition on write-in voting.54 The voter bringing the action claimed 
that the state’s refusal to count votes for a candidate not officially on 
the ballot violated his constitutional rights of expression and 
association.55 First, the Court determined that the burden imposed by 
this restriction was limited because Hawaii’s system provided ample 
opportunity for candidates to participate in the state’s open primary.56 
Because there were no identifiable barriers for candidates seeking to 
appear on the ballot, “any burden on voters’ freedom of choice and 
association is borne only by those who fail to identify their candidate 
of choice until days before the primary.”57 The Court previously 
determined any interest a candidate and his supporters had in making a 
late rather than early decision was of minimal significance.58 
 Next, the Court considered the interests advanced by the state 
of Hawaii.59 The majority cited several benefits the restriction 
provided, including avoiding the possibility of unrestrained 
factionalism, averting divisive sore-loser candidacies, voter focus 
upon contested races in the general election, and guarding against 
party raiding.60 The opinion implied that these interests are far more 




54 Id. at 430. 
55 Id. at 430-31. 
56 Id. at 435-36, 437. 
57 Id. at 436-37. 
58 Id. at 437. 
59 Id. at 439. 
60 Id. Party raiding refers to a political tactic where a political party’s members 
will vote in another party’s primary to nominate a weaker candidate. 
8
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than adequate to defeat the challenge.61 Where an election scheme 
imposes only a minimal burden on the right to vote and provides 
constitutionally sufficient ballot access, any legitimate state interest 
will generally prevail.62 
 
 
B. What is a “Severe Restriction”? 
 
As described above, a court analyzing the constitutionality of 
an election regulation begins with an inquiry into whether the law 
imposes a severe restriction on the right to vote.63 In Dunn v. 
Blumstein, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that a state election law 
that categorically prevents certain citizens from voting must be 
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest.64 Indeed, 
complete denial of franchise is the most severe possible restriction of 
that right. But short of outright denial, what constitutes a severe 
restriction? 
The Court first used the language of “severe restrictions” in 
Norman v. Reed.65 There, the Court considered Illinois’ requirements 
for new political parties seeking access to local and statewide office.66 
Illinois required that new political parties gather 25,000 qualified voter 
signatures in each district their candidates sought office.67 A party 
seeking municipal office for one candidate in the city of Chicago and 
another candidate for a surrounding suburb had to acquire 25,000 
                                                 
61 See id. at 439-40. 
62 See id. at 439-42. 
63 See, e.g., id.  
64 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (quoting Kramer v. Union 
Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)) (“We concluded that if a 
challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to 
others, ‘the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a 
compelling state interest.’”).  
65 Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 280 (1992). 
66 Id. at 282. 
67 Id. 
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each.68 If that party also wished to run a candidate for county-wide 
office, the signature requirement was essentially 50,000 (where it 
would otherwise be only 25,000). This is because failure to acquire 
enough signatures in any district disqualified the party’s entire slate.69 
Although Illinois’ ballot-access scheme was onerous, it was not 
insurmountable. Nevertheless, the Court concluded these requirements 
severely restricted the right of “like-minded voters to gather in pursuit 
of common political ends.”70 Accordingly, it determined that Illinois 
did not choose the most narrowly tailored means of advancing their 
interest in demonstrating a distribution of support for new parties.71  
In subsequent decisions, the Court has repeated its position that 
strict scrutiny72 is appropriate for election regulations imposing a 
severe burden on constitutional rights.73 In California Democratic 
Party v. Jones,74 the Court found a California law placed a severe 
burden on the right of political association.75 Proposition 198 changed 
the state’s partisan primary election system.76 Before the law took 
effect, only members of a particular party could vote for its candidates 
in the primary.77 Proposition 198 converted the state’s primary to a 
“blanket” system where each voter would be free to select any 
candidate, regardless of that candidate’s party affiliation.78 The law 
granted voters who refused to expressly affiliate with these parties, or 
those that openly affiliated with rivals, legal authority to affect the 
                                                 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 292-92. 
70 Id. at 288, 293-94. 
71 Id. at 293-94. 
72 To pass strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling 
government interest. 
73 E.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); Clingman v. Beaver, 
544 U.S. 581, 592 (2005); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 
358 (1997). 
74 California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
75 Id. at 582. 
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parties’ candidate selection.79 The Court concluded the law impaired 
actual party members’ ability to choose their own candidates.80 Also, 
the Court compelled the parties to change their message due to the 
adulteration of their candidate selection process.81 The Court found 
that although these restrictions did not completely deny franchise, they 
severely burdened that right, and therefore strict scrutiny was 
appropriate.82 
These cases illustrate how the Court is willing to apply strict 
scrutiny even where a regulation’s effects threaten less than outright 
denial of voting rights. However, the Court’s opinions do not offer any 
indication for how lower courts should apply this standard.83 In cases 
discussing this type of analysis, the Court reaches its conclusions 
subjectively and declines to further specify when a burden becomes 
severe. Predictably, lower courts routinely disagree whether a law’s 
effects meet this threshold.  
 
 
C.  Crawford v. Marion County Election Board extends the 
election regulation test to voter ID laws 
 
While certain states have requested optional, non-photo 
identification from voters since the 1950s, only in recent years have 
states begun passing laws requiring photo ID at the polls. Indiana and 
Georgia were the first states to pass a “strict” photo ID requirement in 
2005.84 First implemented in 2008, these strict voter ID laws required 
that in-person voters verify their identity with an acceptable 
                                                 
79 Id. at 577. 
80 Id. at 578. 
81 Id. at 581. 
82 Id. at 582. 
83 See generally Joshua A. Douglas, Comment, A Vote for Clarity: Updating 
the Supreme Court’s Severe Burden Test for State Election Regulations That 
Adversely Impact an Individual’s Right to Vote, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 372, 377-86 
(2007).  
84 History of Voter ID, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 16, 
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id-history.aspx. 
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government issued photo ID before their ballot will count.85  In 
Crawford, the Supreme Court considered a facial challenge to 
Indiana’s law under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,86 marking the first time the U.S. Supreme Court 
examined the constitutionality of a state photo ID requirement for 
voting.  
Indiana’s SEA 483 required that in-person voters show either a 
state or federal government issued photo ID.87 Voters who mail in 
absentee ballots are not affected by the requirement.88 Those voting in 
person without ID may fill out a provisional ballot which will count 
only if the voter then makes a separate trip to the county election 
office within 10 days following the election.89 There, the voter must 
either show an acceptable ID or sign an affidavit claiming indigence or 
a religious objection before their ballot will count.90 The law provided 
an exception for individuals residing in a state-licensed care facility 
such as a nursing home.91 
Importantly, the plurality affirmed that voter ID requirements 
are properly analyzed under the framework developed in the election 
cases outlined above.92 Voter ID requirements which place a severe 
limitation on voters’ rights must be narrowly tailored to meet a 
compelling state interest.93 Where that burden is less than severe, 
courts should balance it against the benefits the law provides for the 
state.94 Accordingly, “[h]owever slight that burden may appear . . . , it 
                                                 
85 Id. 
86 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 185 (2008). 
87 Id. at 185. 
88 Id. at 185-86. 
89 Id. at 186. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 190-91. 
93 See id. 
94 Id. 
12
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must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests ‘sufficiently 
weighty to justify the limitation.’”95 
The plurality began its analysis by addressing the interests 
advanced by the state.96 Each interest advanced by the state, in some 
part, relates to the state’s primary concern: voter fraud.97 To begin, the 
plurality discussed election modernization and referenced two recently 
enacted federal statutes that raise certain concerns SEA 483 
addresses.98  
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 included a 
provision restricting states’ ability to purge names from their voter 
rolls.99 The lower court found credible evidence indicating that 
Indiana’s 2004 registration lists were inflated by as much as 41.4 
percent because they contained the names of persons either deceased 
or no longer living in the state.100 Although the plurality 
acknowledged that this is partly a product of Indiana’s own 
maladministration, it credited the issue as a “neutral and 
nondiscriminatory reason supporting the state’s decision to require 
photo identification.”101 
The Help America Vote Act required that states keep a digital 
list of statewide voters and verify new voter registration information 
against that list.102 Although this information can be verified by 
documents such as a bank statement, paycheck or utility bill, Indiana’s 
photo ID requirement effectively establishes a voter’s qualification.103 
Next, the plurality discussed Indiana’s interest in deterring and 
detecting voter fraud.104 It is well settled that states have a genuine 
                                                 
95 Id. at 191 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992)). 
96 Id. 
97 See id. 
98 Id. at 192. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 191-92, 196-97. 
102 Id. at 192. 
103 Id. at 193. 
104 Id. at 194. 
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interest in ensuring the legitimacy of their elections.105 The plurality 
claimed that “carefully identifying all voters participating in the 
election process” also serves a valid interest in orderly administration 
and accurate recordkeeping.106 However, the plurality was careful to 
recognize that the record contained no evidence of in-person voter 
fraud ever occurring within the state.107 
Finally, the plurality mentioned Indiana’s contention that the 
law safeguards voter confidence.108 While this concern really 
addresses the public perception of voter fraud, the plurality suggested 
that “public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process has 
independent significance because it encourages citizen participation in 
the democratic process.”109 It further noted that the electoral system 
cannot inspire this confidence without some protections against fraud 
or abuse, such as voter ID laws.110  
The plurality then considered the injury to voters’ rights. It 
began with a cursory acknowledgement that the ID requirement 
presents certain novel issues.111 For example, states commonly charge 
a fee for issuing an ID.112 However, Indiana waives this fee. Other 
examples include the possibility of physical ID cards getting lost or 
stolen or a voter’s ID photo no longer accurately depicting the 
individual due to age, hairstyle, facial hair, etc.113 But the plurality 
summarily dismissed these issues because voters have the option of 
casting a provisional ballot.114 These provisional ballots will 
ultimately count so long as voters return to the circuit clerk within ten 
days and either show a proper ID or sign an affidavit claiming 
                                                 
105 Id. at 196. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 194-95. 
108 Id. at 197. 
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 Id. 




Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 8
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss2/8
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 10, Issue 2                        Spring 2015 
 
479 
indigence or a religious objection.115 The plurality also found any 
inconvenience cost associated with acquiring the ID insignificant.116 
For the plurality, the more troubling issue was eligible voters 
for whom it is difficult or downright impossible to obtain acceptable 
identification.117 For many, these problems originate with locating or 
acquiring documents the state requires before issuing ID, such as a 
birth certificate.118 The record indicated that some may face financial 
issues with the document fees or travel costs.119 Many elderly voters, 
especially the indigent, could not locate any record of their birth from 
which to obtain a birth certificate.120 For some, this was because they 
were born long ago, out of state, and/or outside of a hospital.121 
However, the plurality minimized this concern by again citing the 
provisional ballot option and affidavit exception.122 
Another obstacle voters faced was finding adequate 
transportation. Voters without cars must sometimes travel significant 
distances to acquire the underlying documents and the photo ID.123 
Some voters found this far more difficult than traveling to the local 
polling place, especially because Indiana lacks any form of public 
transportation in much of the state.124  
On the other hand, the record did not contain a credible 
estimation of the number of voters without ID.125 It also did not 
conclusively demonstrate the burden those voters would endure.126 
Those deposed in the record and the named plaintiffs failed to show 
                                                 
115 Id. at 186. 
116 Id. at 198. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 199. 
119 Id. at 211 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
120 Id. at 199 (majority opinion). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 213-14 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 200 (majority opinion). 
126 Id. at 201. 
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that the law prevented them from voting.127 They were either 
ultimately successful, eligible to submit an absentee ballot without ID, 
or presented inadequate testimony otherwise.128 The record did contain 
an affidavit from a homeless woman denied ID because she had no 
home address, despite having all necessary documentation; however, 
the plurality could not determine how common this problem was from 
a single occurrence.129 
Ultimately, the plurality found the evidence in the record 
inadequate and therefore, they found it impossible to “quantify either 
the magnitude of the burden on this narrow class of voters or the 
portion of the burden imposed on them that is fully justified.”130 
Because of this, the plurality declined to weigh the interests of a small 
subset of voters against the broad interests advanced by the state.131 
Moreover, Justice Stevens remarked on the high burden of persuasion 
necessary for the plurality to sustain a facial attack on the entire 
statute.132 But, the plurality opinion left open the possibility that a 
plaintiff who presents a more developed record, challenges a more 
burdensome law, or brings an as-applied constitutional challenge 
might carry this burden. In Frank v. Walker, the Seventh Circuit 
considered such a constitutional challenge. 
 
 
II.  FRANK V. WALKER 
 
In 2011, the Wisconsin Legislature passed its version of a strict 
photo ID voter eligibility law.133 2011 Wisconsin Act 23, signed into 
law by Governor Scott Walker, is somewhat similar to the Indiana law 
                                                 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 201-02. 
130 Id. at 200. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 841 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev'd, 768 F.3d 
744 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015). 
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upheld in Crawford. For example, individuals must show one of nine 
qualifying photo IDs before a poll worker will give them a ballot to 
vote.134 Voters without ID may submit a provisional ballot which is 
counted after a subsequent trip to the municipal clerk’s office.135 Also, 
the law provides an exception for those confined to their home or a 
care facility due to age, sickness, injury, or disability.136 
However, Act 23 is more restrictive than Indiana’s SEA 483 in 
several important ways. First, the Wisconsin law does not allow those 
voting through provisional ballots the option to sign an affidavit 
claiming indigence or a religious objection.137 When subsequently 
appearing at the municipal clerk’s office, voters must show one of the 
same qualified forms of ID expected by poll workers.138 The Crawford 
Court relied on Indiana’s affidavit exception as a substantial 
mitigating factor in its analysis.139 Second, Act 23 requires ID from 
absentee voters.140 Only those in the military, living overseas, or who 
have previously satisfied the ID requirement and maintain the same 
home address are exempted from the ID requirement for absentee 
ballots.141 Indiana’s law does not impose this requirement on absentee 
voters, and the Crawford Court specifically cited this fact to minimize 






                                                 
134 Id. at 843. 
135 Id. at 844. 
136 Id. 
137 See id. 
138 Id. 
139 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 199 (2008). 
140 Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 844. 
141 Id. 
142 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 201. 
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A. The Eastern District of Wisconsin finds Act 23 
unconstitutional; the state appeals 
 
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin, plaintiffs brought an as-applied constitutional challenge to 
Act 23 under the Fourteenth Amendment.143 Before his analysis of Act 
23, District Judge Lynn Adelman addressed the precedential effect of 
the Crawford decision. He first concluded that because six of the 
Justices agreed that the Anderson/Burdick balancing test applied to 
Indiana’s strict photo ID voter eligibility law, Act 23 should be 
evaluated likewise.144 Judge Adelman then discussed the effect of the 
split among Justices regarding whether such laws could be invalidated 
on the basis of their effect on a subgroup of voters.145 He determined 
that Crawford is not binding precedent on the issue.146 However, after 
consideration of the Anderson and Burdick cases themselves, he 
concluded that they “require invalidation of a law when the state 
interests are insufficient to justify the burdens the law imposes on 
subgroups of voters.”147 
Judge Adelman began his analysis by addressing the state’s 
four justifications for the law: 1) detecting and preventing in-person 
voter-impersonation fraud; 2) promoting public confidence in the 
                                                 
143 Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 842. Plaintiffs also brought a statutory challenge 
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; however, any statutory analysis is beyond 
the scope of this comment. 
144 Id. at 845. 
145 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200-03, 206. While the three Justice concurrence 
opines that voter ID laws should be evaluated on the “basis of their ‘reasonably 
foreseeable effect on voters generally,’” the three Justice Plurality opinion implies 
that such laws could be invalidated solely by their effect on a subgroup of voters. Id. 
146 Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 846 (The plurality opinion was narrowest because 
it did not reach additional constitutional question of whether “a law could be 
invalidated based on the burdens imposed on a subgroup of voters.”) (citing Marks 
v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a 
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 
the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those members 
who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.”)). 
147 Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 846-47. 
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integrity of the electoral process; 3) detecting and deterring other types 
of voter fraud; and 4) promoting orderly election administration and 
accurate recordkeeping.148  
First, Judge Adelman accorded the state’s interest in voter-
fraud prevention very little weight despite acknowledging that voter 
fraud prevention is a legitimate state interest.149 The evidence at trial 
demonstrated that in-person voter impersonation fraud is virtually non-
existent in Wisconsin.150 Dispatching any contention that a lack of 
voter-fraud evidence was attributable to underenforcement of existing 
laws, Judge Adelman cited three fruitless sweeps in the state’s recent 
history: the 2002 Department of Justice Ballot Access and Voting 
Integrity Initiative, the 2004 Joint Task Force, and the 2008 Election 
Fraud Task Force.151 He also dismissed the claim that the lack of 
evidence was due to the difficulty of detecting such fraud.152 Although 
the fraud itself may be difficult to detect, he suggested there would 
surely be more circumstantial evidence of it.153 For example, voters 
would find that a ballot had already been cast in their name.154 Lastly, 
the evidence indicated that any development of future fraud issues was 
exceedingly unlikely; therefore, “Act 23 cannot be deemed a 
reasonable response to a potential problem.”155 
Second, Judge Adelman concluded that “Act 23 does not 
further the state interest of promoting public confidence in the 
integrity of the electoral process.”156 The state presented no empirical 
evidence supporting this claim; however, the plaintiffs presented 
evidence in rebuttal.157 At trial, a professor of political science testified 
                                                 
148 Id. at 847. 
149 Id.  
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 848-49. 
152 Id. at 849-50. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 849. 
155 Id. at 850. 
156 Id. at 852. 
157 Id. at 851. 
19
Pikor: Voter ID in Wisconsin: A Better Approach to Anderson/Burdick Bala
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2015
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 10, Issue 2                        Spring 2015 
 
484 
that photo ID requirements have no actual effect on “a person’s level 
of trust or confidence in the electoral process.”158 Another professor, 
specializing in the study of the incidence of voter fraud in 
contemporary American elections, testified that photo ID laws actually 
undermine voter confidence.159 This is because the laws create a “false 
perception that voter-impersonation fraud is widespread.”160 
Furthermore, Judge Adelman argued that the laws work against public 
confidence because much of the electorate believes that the ID 
requirement disenfranchises and marginalizes many voters.161 
Third, the Judge addressed the state’s claim that the ID 
requirement will help detect and deter other forms of fraud, such as 
voting by felons or non-citizens and double voting.162 Again, the state 
presented no evidence in support of this claim.163 In fact, the state 
neglected to adequately explain how the law might prevent these types 
of fraud.164  
Fourth, Judge Adelman found that any state interest Act 23 
serves in promoting orderly election administration and accurate 
recordkeeping is inseparable from the state’s interest in preventing 
voter fraud.165 Because the defendants have failed to show how these 
interests are distinct, the Judge found that “Act 23 serves the state’s 
interest in orderly election administration and accurate recordkeeping 
only to the extent that it serves the state’s interest in detecting and 
preventing voter fraud.”166 
Judge Adelman then examined the burdens Act 23 imposes on 
voters.167 To begin, he acknowledged that the laws adverse effects 
                                                 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 848, 851. 
160 Id. 
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were felt primarily by those who did not currently possess qualifying 
ID.168 Credible evidence at trial indicated that approximately 300,000 
registered voters fit this description.169 Those individuals, who would 
not otherwise require it, must take the necessary steps to obtain an ID 
exclusively for the purpose of voting.170 Evidence also indicated that a 
substantial portion of those voters without ID are low income 
individuals.171 And because the Wisconsin law lacked any exceptions 
similar to the indigence affidavit allowed by the Indiana law, all of 
those voters must physically obtain proper ID to vote.172 
To obtain proper ID, voters must first identify the requirements 
for the ID and any required underlying documents such as a social 
security card or birth certificate.173 The voter must then account for the 
time and effort required to get the ID. Voters must travel to the DMV 
at least once, and if necessary, to the other various government offices 
for the other required documents.174  
There are financial costs to consider as well. Low-income 
individuals without a driver’s license often must pay to use public 
transportation, which is not available everywhere in the state.175 Also, 
although the state offers a free ID card, the underlying documents 
often cost money.176 And due to the narrow business hours for state 
agencies, these voters almost certainly require time off from work.177 
Sometimes problems arise in the form of clerical errors where 
the name on the birth certificate is not correct.178 To remedy these 
                                                 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 854. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 See id. at 863. 
173 Id. at 857. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 857-58. 
176 Id. at 858. 
177 Id. at 857. 
178 Id. at 859. 
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problems, the amendment process requires that the voter must make 
additional trips to various agencies.179  
Judge Adelman then proceeded to weigh the burden on voters 
against state interests.180 Because of these obstacles and the supporting 
evidence at trial, he concluded that a “substantial number of the 
300,000 plus voters who lack a qualifying ID will be deterred from 
voting.”181 In fact, the record contains testimony from eight Wisconsin 
residents who wished to vote in the upcoming election but could not 
secure an acceptable ID.182 Therefore, “it is absolutely clear that Act 
23 will prevent more legitimate votes from being cast than fraudulent 
votes.”183 Accordingly, the state’s asserted interest in detecting and 
preventing in-person voter fraud did not justify those burdens.184 As 
for the other three justifications advanced by the state, as discussed 
above, there was either no supporting evidence or counter-balancing 
considerations.185 Thus, “the burdens imposed by Act 23 on those who 
lack an ID are not justified.”186 Judge Adelman therefore held the law 
violated Fourth Amendment protections and enjoined its 
enforcement.187 The state immediately appealed and motioned for stay. 
On September 12, 2014, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stayed 
the district court’s injunction pending the outcome on appeal.188 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit Reverses 
 
Judge Easterbrook authored the unanimous opinion for the 
three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
                                                 
179 Id. at 859-60. 
180 Id. at 862. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 854-55. 
183 Id. at 862. 
184 Id. at 862. 
185 Id. at 852-53. 
186 Id. at 862-63. 
187 Id. 
188 Frank v. Walker, 769 F.3d 494 (7th. Cir. 2014). 
22
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 8
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss2/8
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 10, Issue 2                        Spring 2015 
 
487 
reviewed the case de novo, and reversed the lower court’s ruling.189 
The panel held that Judge Adelman’s findings “did not justify an 
outcome different from Crawford.”190 Although it agreed that 
Wisconsin’s Act 23 differed from Indiana’s SEA 483, the panel found 
any differences legally insignificant.191 
First, the court dismissed any claim that Act 23 placed a higher 
burden on voters than the Indiana law, and insisted voters face no 
more difficulty in obtaining a qualifying ID in Wisconsin than they did 
in Indiana.192 It argued that Wisconsin residents who fail to acquire the 
requisite ID are not disenfranchised.193 Rather, they are merely 
marginalized.194 The court did not find this troubling because “any 
procedural step filters out some potential voters.”195 It stated that 
because the DMW issues photo ID to anyone with a birth certificate, 
all that can be inferred from a person without ID is that “he was 
unwilling to invest the necessary time.”196 The court concluded that 
foregoing a photo ID is a matter of choice for most eligible voters.197 
In support, it cited a district court finding that more than half of the 
eligible voters without ID possess a birth certificate.198 Because the 
process of obtaining an ID is no more difficult in Wisconsin than 
Indiana, the lower court’s ruling can only stand if the Act does not 
serve any important purpose.199 
                                                 
189 Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
1551 (2015). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 746. 
192 Id. at 749. 
193 Id. at 748. 
194 See id. at 748-49. 
195 Id. at 749. 
196 Id. at 748. 
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The Seventh Circuit determined that the important purpose Act 
23 served is also indistinguishable from the Indiana law.200 The court 
dismissed the importance of the lower court’s determination that voter 
fraud is non-existent because this was also the determination in 
Crawford.201 The court required no evidence from the state for the 
remaining three justifications: fraud deterrence, accurate 
recordkeeping, and strengthening voter confidence.202 The Supreme 
Court believed these were sound justifications for Indiana’s law; 
therefore, they were equally sound justifications for Act 23.203  
The panel specifically referred to the Crawford Court’s 
determination that an ID requirement promotes public confidence in 
the electoral system.204 It labeled this finding a “legislative fact”205 and 
stated that the district court must accept such findings from the higher 
court.206  It reasoned that ID laws “either promote confidence, or they 
don’t; there is no way they could promote public confidence in Indiana 
(as Crawford concluded) and not in Wisconsin.”207 Because the 
Supreme Court already concluded that they promote confidence, a 
district court judge cannot conclude otherwise, even when presented 
with new and compelling evidence.208 And because these laws 
promote confidence, there is sufficient state interest.209 Therefore, 
unless plaintiffs can show they suffer significantly higher burdens 
obtaining proper ID than voters in Indiana, the laws are valid in every 
                                                 
200 See id. at 749-50. 
201 Id. 
202 See id. at 750. 
203 See id. 
204 Id. 
205 A legislative fact refers to a broad, general fact that is not unique and 
relates indirectly to the parties to litigation. Judge Easterbrook defines a legislative 
fact as “a proposition about the state of the world, as opposed to a proposition about 
these litigants or about a single state.” Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 See id. 
209 Id. at 751. 
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state.210 On March 23, 2015, the Supreme Court announced its 
decision to decline review of the case. 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
In the Frank opinion, Judge Easterbrook highlighted a very 
important distinction: the difference between disenfranchisement and 
marginalization.211 Indeed, the proper analysis of a particular law 
depends on it. Dunn212 and its progeny are still precedential, so where 
a plaintiff can show that voters have been categorically prevented from 
accessing the polls, strict scrutiny should be applied. Heightened 
scrutiny is also appropriate where a law makes it significantly more 
difficult to vote, thereby suppressing voters.213 But the level of 
suppression courts should tolerate remains unclear. 
 
A. A strategic balance 
 
As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court has been 
ambiguous about precisely when an election law imposes a severe 
burden on voters. In Crawford, the Court found the record insufficient 
to support a claim that Indiana’s voter ID law crossed that line.214 
However, the record was more developed in Frank.215 There, credible 
evidence suggested that compared to Indiana, six times as many 
registered voters in Wisconsin would be affected.216 Also, 
                                                 
210 Id. at 750. 
211 Id. at 748. 
212 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
213 E.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
214 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008). 
215 See Frank, 773 F.3d 783; Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854-55 
(E.D. Wis. 2014), rev'd, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 
(2015).  
216 District Judge Barker “estimated that as of 2005, when the statute was 
enacted, around 43,000 Indiana residents lacked a state-issued driver’s license or 
identification card.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 188-89. District Judge Adelman found 
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considerations such as financial costs, inconvenience, travel issues, 
and time off work were more substantiated through statistical and 
testimonial evidence.217 Despite this, the district court in Frank 
seemed to concede, without deliberation, that Wisconsin’s law does 
not impose severe restrictions.218 It proceeded directly to balancing the 
law’s burden on voters against the state’s asserted justifications.219 The 
conservative panel in the court of appeals certainly did not raise the 
issue in the district court’s stead.  
Perhaps Judge Adelman made a strategic choice in his district 
court opinion. The U.S. Supreme Court rarely characterizes a law’s 
effects as severe. Decided in 2000, California Democratic Party was 
the most recent case where the Court applied strict scrutiny because an 
election regulation severely burdened voters. 220 This could reasonably 
imply that this standard is quite high. Additionally, the Court has not 
suggested any bright line rules or factors for consideration. Instead, it 
has simply invited the lower courts to make a “hard judgment.”221 
But in making such a subjective judgment, a lower court leaves 
itself especially vulnerable to an adverse ruling on appeal. Despite 
careful use of empirical evidence to show a substantial burden on 
voters, any characterization of that burden as severe is entirely judicial 
discretion. Conversely, a lower court would likely be less susceptible 
to reversal where it carefully evaluated the evidence demonstrating 
both a law’s burden on voters and the supporting justifications 
advanced by the state. Although there would still be some subjectivity 
to the balance of interests, a higher court would certainly have to work 
harder to undo such analysis by a lower court. 
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit panel did overturn Judge 
Adelson’s ruling, but not without exposing its subjectivity. The court 
                                                                                                                   
“that approximately 300,000 registered voters in Wisconsin, roughly 9% of all 
registered voters, lack a qualifying ID.” Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 854. 
217 See Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 854-55. 
218 Id. at 846-47.  
219 Id. at 847. 
220 California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000).  
221 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190. 
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embraced certain pieces of evidence, ignored others, and supported 
several of its conclusions with false statements and erroneous 
assumptions.222 More importantly, even if the Seventh Circuit arrived 
at the proper legal result, it is unlikely it secured an efficient outcome.  
Credible evidence indicated that 300,000 people would have to 
take affirmative action to maintain their right to vote.223 Many of them 
must spend substantial time, money, and effort to do so.224 
Furthermore, the district court found the evidence conclusive that the 
law would prevent more legitimate votes from being cast than 
fraudulent votes.225 The counterbalancing benefits for the law were 
comparatively weak. The problem lawmakers designed the law to fix 
does not exist in Wisconsin.226 The Seventh Circuit panel grounded its 
justification primarily on the Supreme Court’s speculative assumption 
that voter ID laws improved voter confidence,227 despite credible 
recent evidence to the contrary.228 Judges can only reasonably uphold 
                                                 
222 See generally Frank 773 F.3d at 783 (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (describing the Seventh Circuit Panel’s erroneous justifications 
for its ruling. For example, the panel opinion states that Act 23 would prevent voting 
by underage children and non-citizens; however non-citizens can easily obtain a 
Wisconsin state-issued ID and acceptable student IDs need not include a date of 
birth. Other examples include the panel opinion’s erroneous assumption that photo 
ID cannot be a burdensome requirement because one needs it to fly, pick up 
prescriptions at pharmacies, open a bank account. However, in Wisconsin, one does 
not need an ID for all prescriptions; bank customers do not need photo ID to open an 
account; Federal law does not require photo ID to purchase firearms at gun shows, 
flea markets or online; and the Supreme Court requires no ID of visitors.). 
223 Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 854. 
224 Id. at 855-57.  
225 Id. at 862. 
226 Id. at 847-48. 
227 Frank, 768 F. 3d at 750-51 (arguing that because the Supreme Court 
previously concluded voter ID laws promote confidence, a district judge cannot 
subsequently dispute this finding, even when presented with recent evidence which 
contradicts that conclusion). 
228 Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 851. See Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel 
Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the 
Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1756 
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a law with such doubtful net advantages so long as the legal test 
maintains its deference to the state.  
 
B. Addressing the proper concern 
 
The Anderson/Burdick balance grants this deference to state 
regulations that impose less than a severe burden on voters.229 The 
Supreme Court describes such non-severe regulations as evenhanded, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory,230 essentially referring to facially 
neutral laws. However, there is compelling evidence that laws like Act 
23, though facially neutral, disproportionately affect African 
Americans, Latinos, women, and the indigent.231 Although several of 
these subgroups are constitutionally protected classes for purposes of 
equal protection, a discriminatory impact upon them is not sufficient 
to violate those protections.232 A plaintiff must demonstrate 
discriminatory intent, which can be difficult to confirm.233 Perhaps this 
contributed to the Supreme Court’s decision to adopt a balancing test 
for election regulations. Regardless, few would seriously argue that 
voter ID laws are primarily motivated by racial prejudice, outright 
sexism, or animosity toward the poor. However, there is reason to 
suspect that voter ID laws, like most of history’s controversial election 
regulations, originate with political self-interest. 
As mentioned above, the United States has an extensive history 
of voter suppression with facially neutral laws. For example, 
                                                                                                                   
(2008) (concluding no relationship between voter ID laws and a person’s level of 
trust or confidence in the electoral system).  
229 E.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); Timmons v. Twin 
Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997); Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 
581, 592 (2005). 
230 E.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189-90 (2008). 
231 See generally Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 870-79 (discussing the evidence 
presented at trial that Act 23 disproportionately affects Black, Latino and indigent 
voters); Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Measuring the Impact of Photo ID Over Time 
and its Impact on Women, 48 Ind. L. Rev. 605 (2015).  
232 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). 
233 See, e.g., id. 
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Massachusetts and Connecticut adopted literacy tests in the 1850s.234 
These requirements suppressed and disenfranchised the poor and 
uneducated, and thus disproportionately affected African-American 
and Native American subgroups.235 Congress waited until 1975 before 
passing a permanent nationwide ban on literacy tests.236 More recent 
examples of facially neutral laws that disproportionately impact 
minority groups include felon disenfranchisement, the elimination of 
early voting opportunities, and voter ID laws. 
The most troubling contemporary concerns regarding election 
regulations are political. The obvious fear is that lawmakers might 
manipulate election laws to entrench themselves in office. Less 
conspicuous, but equally troubling, is the possibility that confirmation 
bias237 blinds lawmakers, leading to the irrational justification of a 
laws virtue.238 And to be clear, these concerns lie on both sides of the 
aisle. For example, literacy tests and other suppressive election 
regulations made Republicans unelectable in the southern state general 
elections for a substantial period.239 Early voting restrictions often 
disproportionately affect black voters, which adversely affects 
democratic turnout.240 Both Republican and Democratic controlled 
                                                 
234 KEYSSAR, supra note 27 at 142. 
235 Id. at 112, 255. 
236 Id. at 274. 
237 See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous 
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2(2) Rev. of Gen. Psy. 175 (1998). (“Confirmation 
bias, as the term is typically used in the psychological literature, connotes the 
seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, 
expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.”) 
238 Id. at 191-92 (discussing cognitive bias as applied to policy rationalization). 
239 See KEYSSAR, supra note 27 at 107-08. 
240 Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 440 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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Legislatures have gerrymandered241 district boundaries to all but 
guarantee their party victory in certain district-wide elections.242 
Nevertheless, voter ID laws benefit republicans politically. 
And critics of these laws argue they are designed to do just that. For 
example, in his dissent from the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in 
Crawford, Judge Evans characterized Indiana’s voter ID law as “a not-
too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage election-day turnout by certain 
folks believed to skew Democratic.”243 
When passing Act 23, Wisconsin legislators predictably split 
along party lines. Republican legislators voted unanimously for the 
law, democrats united against it.244 The liberal district court judge 
ruled against it;245 the conservative three-judge panel in the Seventh 
Circuit ruled in favor of the law.246 Conservative and liberal media 
outlets predictably tow their respective party’s line.247 Of course, the 
fact that support for this particular policy almost universally depends 
on party alignment does not necessarily mean that support is guided by 
politics rather than a genuine interest in election integrity. However, it 
does raise justifiable suspicion. But because proponents of such laws 
                                                 
241 Gerrymandering refers to the manipulation of district boundaries to secure 
an electoral advantage for a certain political party. 
242 Robert Weiner and Tom Sherman, Gerrymandering: A Plague on Both Our 
Parties!, TRUTH-OUT.ORG (Oct. 29, 2014, 09:26 A.M.), http://www.truth-
out.org/opinion/item/27117-gerrymandering-a-plague-on-both-our-parties. 
243 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(Evans, J., dissenting), aff'd, 553 U.S. 181 (2008).  
244 Wisconsin Assembly, supra note 18.  
245 Jennifer Rubin, A Walker win on voter ID, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 
24 2015, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-
turn/wp/2015/03/24/a-walker-win-on-voter-id/. 
246 Ian Millhiser, Three Republican Judges Just Gave A Big Leg Up To Scott 
Walker’s Reelection Campaign, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 12, 2014, 6:06 A.M.), 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/09/12/3567181/three-republican-judges-just-
gave-a-big-leg-up-to-scott-walkers-reelection-campaign/.  
247 See, e.g., Meagan Hatcher-Mays, Fox News Viewers Aren’t Getting The 
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have been able to advance some justification for them, even if 
hypothetical or speculative, the laws stand. Again, this is possible 
because the Anderson/Burdick balance grants deference to states’ 
interests. To remedy this, courts should carve an exception where 
misconduct appears likely. 
 
C. A better approach to Anderson/Burdick balancing 
 
An effective constitutional analysis of election laws needs to 
acknowledge the possibility of improper partisanship by lawmakers. 
Accordingly, where a plaintiff can demonstrate a strong likelihood that 
the primary motive for a law’s passage is political, courts should not 
accord the state deference.248 Courts should consider factors such as 
whether a law: (1) confers a political advantage to the enacting 
lawmakers or their party; (2) politically disadvantages their opponents 
or an opposing party; (3) dilutes or otherwise weakens the political 
participation of identifiable groups of voters; and (4) creates sharp 
division along party lines. Where this improper partisanship appears 
likely, a court’s presumption should shift in favor of the plaintiff; and 
the burden of showing that the law’s benefits outweigh its burden on 
voters should fall upon the state.  
  This burden-shifting approach would be effective for several 
reasons. First, it would help ensure the utility of election regulations 
and discourage lawmakers from passing unnecessary, bureaucratic 
laws. Although regulations which offset the benefits they provide by 
imposing equally burdensome restrictions are generally undesirable, 
courts appropriately give state lawmakers wide latitude to regulate 
their own elections.249 However, ethically questionable election 
regulations that fail to provide clear, demonstrable, and convincing 
benefits should not stand. The elimination of such zero-sum 
                                                 
248 Of course, plaintiffs must first show that the law interferes with their ability 
to vote. 
249 E.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (describing how it is 
important for courts to allow states to substantially regulate their elections).  
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regulations would help ensure lawmakers keep focus on public policy 
rather than political maneuvering.  
 Second, this approach would increase voter confidence. As the 
Supreme Court noted in Crawford, “public confidence in the integrity 
of the electoral process has independent significance, because it 
encourages citizen participation in the democratic process.” 250 As 
discussed above, the United States has a troubling history involving 
election law; yet, the current election law analysis ignores politically 
self-serving tactics. This initial inquiry into improper politics would 
bolster a public perception of trust in our electoral system by 
acknowledging the concern and demanding adequate justification 
when it arises. 
 Third, the partisanship inquiry would force judges to confront 
their own political bias.251 Part of the current concern is partisan 
judicial activism. If the constitutional analysis of election regulations 
included an explicit inquiry into improper partisanship, judges would 
be less likely to put a finger on the scale in their party’s favor, 
consciously or subconsciously. This approach would create more 
pressure on judges to sufficiently justify any ruling that furthered their 
own person political interests to both the public and their peers in the 
judiciary.  
 Professor Dan Tokaji suggested inappropriate partisan 
manipulation of state voting processes should trigger heightened 
scrutiny.252 Going even further, Professor Edward B. Foley 
recommended courts replace the Anderson/Burdick balance entirely 
with an inquiry into whether an election regulation was indeed “a ploy 
to achieve a partisan advantage.”253 However, both of these 
approaches fail to allow sufficient room for laws that may appear 
improper but were passed in good faith and provide adequate utility. 
                                                 
250 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 197 (2008). 
251 Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1836, 1863 (2013) (arguing that a court inquiring into improper partisanship 
will likely be more aware of its own political bias). 
252 Daniel P. Tokaji, Judicial Activism and Passivism in Election Law, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. PENNumbra 274, 282 (2011). 
253 Foley, supra note 241 at 1860-64. 
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Also, they run contradictory to the Supreme Court’s history of 
allowing states wide latitude in governing their election procedures. In 
Crawford, the Supreme Court stated that “if a nondiscriminatory law 
is supported by valid neutral justifications, those justifications should 
not be disregarded simply because partisan interests may have 
provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators.”254 
Although entrenchment tactics should be treated harshly in the context 
of election law, concrete evidence of actual intent will seldom be 
available. Rather, courts should consider whether wrongful political 
tactics are likely. Then, by reversing the presumption to favor plaintiffs 
and placing the onus on the state to demonstrate a law’s usefulness, 
courts can adequately address this concern while not overly intruding 
into state sovereignty.  
  If the Seventh Circuit employed this balance-shifting approach 
in Frank, the outcome would certainly be reversed. To begin, all the 
factors supporting a claim of improper partisanship are present; 
support and opposition for Act 23 split along partisan lines255 and 
credible evidence indicated the law disproportionately weakened 
participation by certain subgroups that tend to support democratic 
candidates.256 Thus, the law disadvantaged the Democratic Party, and 
accordingly, conferred a political benefit on its primary rival, the 
Republican Party. Therefore, the Court should disallow the 
presumption favoring the state replace it with the burden of proof. 
Next, as discussed in detail above, defendants in Frank were unable to 
establish Act 23’s benefits to the extent necessary to outweigh its 
burden on voters. Under these facts, the plaintiff’s challenge is 
successful.  
 However, if defendants were able to show that voter fraud was 
present in Wisconsin and that Act 23 competently addressed this 
problem, their burden would be carried. In this scenario, a decision 
favoring defendants is a desirable outcome. Here, the state is 
                                                 
254 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204. 
255 Wisconsin Assembly, supra, note 18. 
256 Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 862, 870 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev'd, 768 
F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015). 
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hypothetically able to demonstrate that our democratic system of 
governance was actively perverted through fraud and the law solved or 
substantially mitigated that problem. Those benefits are substantial 
enough to defeat plaintiffs challenge in this case, even though 
partisanship may have influenced the decisions of individual 
lawmakers.  
 For this hypothetical, if the panel inquired only whether 
improper partisanship was present, like Professor Foley suggested, 
plaintiffs challenge would succeed. This outcome is problematic 
because the fraud would continue. Furthermore, where the only 
solutions available are more easily tolerated by affluent members of 
the electorate, a fix would remain elusive as long as the legislature is 
controlled by republicans. If the court applied heightened scrutiny 
here, as Professor Tokaji suggested, the outcome is less certain. 
Plaintiffs might be able to present a narrower alternative, or the court 
may insist that the state further tailor the current law. Regardless, this 
presents a similar problem. While republicans control Wisconsin’s 
legislature, courts would be forced to closely scrutinize all laws more 
easily tolerated by conservative-leaning groups. Where these laws are 





 The current federal constitutional analysis of individual 
election regulations allows both lawmakers and judges much 
discretion in their respective drafting and evaluation of these laws. 
This is a necessary element for a jurisprudential standard charged with 
overseeing a body of law whose regulations inherently interfere with 
fundamental constitutional rights to some degree. However, while the 
Anderson/Burdick test has provided a more clear and consistent 
mechanism for courts to use when analyzing ballot access restrictions, 
a fundamental piece is still missing. An approach that more 
competently addresses the political nature of election law would both 
decrease improper partisan activity and increase public confidence and 
trust in the system. In Frank, the Seventh Circuit demonstrated the 
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malleability of the Anderson/Burdick balance. Neither the District 
Court nor the Appellate Court clearly erred in their applications of the 
test. But, because the most historically troubling motive in election 
law appeared a likely factor there, both judicial and legislative 
discretion should be narrowed.   
 
35
Pikor: Voter ID in Wisconsin: A Better Approach to Anderson/Burdick Bala
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2015
